Εντολή μνημονίου η συγκυβέρνηση...Να γιατί μιλούσαν για συγκυβέρνηση και μετά έτρεχαν να τα μπαλώσουν...
Δείτε τι περιλαμβάνεται στην αναφορά του ΔΝΤ (Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility) με το νέο μνημόνιο ΙΙ, που θα υπογραφεί από τους νενέκους στην βουλή.
Το ΔΝΤ τα γράφει όχι το Economist ή η Wall Street Journal..
Δείτε τι γράφει για τις εκλογές και την συνεργασία ΠΑΣΟΚ και Ν.Δ...
Μετά από αυτό να δούμε ποιος θα ψηφίσει αυτό το τερατούργημα, αυτό το έκτρωμα, την ταφόπλακα της οικονομίας και της δημοκρατίας στην Ελλάδα.
Σελίδα 37 της αναφοράς του ΔΝΤ για το νέο μνημόνιο (Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility)Πολιτικές διαβεβαιώσεις.
Οι συμφωνίες που συνήφθηκαν με τις αρχές έχουν λάβει ευρεία πολιτική υποστήριξη μέσα από μια μεγάλη πλειοψηφία στο Κοινοβούλιο, για ένα πλαίσιο νόμου που καλύπτει τις λεπτομέρειες του ΜΟΧΠ (ΜΝΗΜΟΝΙΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΟΠΙΣΤΩΤΙΚΗΣ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ).
Επιπλέον, οι σημερινοί ηγέτες του ΠΑΣΟΚ και της ΝΔ έχουν δεσμευθεί δημοσίως σχετικά με τους στόχους του προγράμματος και τα βασικά μέτρα πολιτικής για λογαριασμό των κομμάτων τους, τώρα σε όλη την προεκλογική περίοδο και πέρα από αυτήν. Αυτά τα δύο μέλη του σημερινού συνασπισμού, που βρίσκονται αντίστοιχα στα αριστερά και δεξιά του πολιτικού φάσματος, είναι επίσης ιστορικά τα δύο πλέον εξέχοντα ελληνικά πολιτικά κόμματα.
Η Νέα Δημοκρατία σήμερα προηγείται στις δημοσκοπήσεις. Σε κάθε περίσταση, με δεδομένο το σημερινό πολιτικό κατακερματισμό, το ένα ή τα δύο αυτά κόμματα είναι πιθανό να εμπλακούν σε έναν συνασπισμό μετά τις εκλογές.
Σελίδα 226Δήλωση Θάνου Κατσάμπα, Αναπληρωτή Εκτελεστικού Διευθυντή για..... την Ελλάδα, 15, Μάρ, 2012
Η Ελλάδα βρίσκεται σε ένα ιστορικό σταυροδρόμι. Η κρίση είναι οικονομική και κοινωνική, αλλά η κυβέρνηση συνασπισμού με επικεφαλής τον καθηγητή κ. Λουκά Παπαδήμου, πρώην διοικητής της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδα και πρώην Αντιπρόεδρος της ΕΚΤ, έχει καταφέρει να σταθεροποιήσει το πολιτικό τοπίο και να εξασφαλίσει την υποστήριξη των δύο μεγαλύτερων πολιτικών κομμάτων, του Σοσιαλιστικού Κόμματος με επικεφαλή τον κ. Παπανδρέου (ΠΑΣΟΚ), και του Συντηρητικού Κόμματος με επικεφαλή τον κ. Σαμαρά (Νέα Δημοκρατία). Ακόμη και εάν διεξαχθούν εκλογές στο εγγύς μέλλον (η ακριβής ημερομηνία είναι ακόμα αβέβαιη), ο κ. Παπανδρέου και ο κ. Σαμαράς έδωσαν διαβεβαιώσεις ότι όποιος διαδεχθεί τον κ. Παπαδήμο θα συνεχίσει τις πολιτικές που συμφωνήθηκαν στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος οικονομικής στήριξης.
Υ.Γ
Ο κ. Θάνος Κατσάμπας ήταν μέχρι τον Φεβ.201 Βοηθός-Διευθυντή στο Τμήμα Δημοσιονομικών Υποθέσεων του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου και σήμερα είναι ο εκπρόσωπος της Ελλάδος στο ΔΝΤ.Διαβάστε την αναφορά του ΔΝΤ που περιέχει το νέο Μνημόνιο
© 2012 International Monetary Fund
March 2012IMF Country Report No. 12/57March 9, 2012 March 15, 2012 January 29, 2001February 10, 2012 January 29, 2001
Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; andStatement by the Executive Director for Greece.
In the context of the request for extended arrangement under the extended fund facility, the followingdocuments have been released and are included in this package:
The staff report for the Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended FundFacility, prepared by a staff team of the IMF, following discussions that ended on February10, 2012, with the officials of Greece on economic developments and policies. Based oninformation available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed onMarch 9, 2012. The views expressed in the staff report are those of the staff team and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the Executive Board of the IMF.
A staff supplement of March 9, 2012 on the assessment of the risks to the fund and the fund'sliquidity position.
A Press Release summarizing the views of the Executive Board as expressed during itsMarch 15, 2012 discussion of the staff report that completed the request.
A statement by the Executive Director for Greece.The documents listed below have been or will be separately released.Letter of Intent *Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies *Technical Memorandum of Understanding*Letter of Intent to
the European Commission and the European Central Bank*
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality**Also included in Staff ReportThe policy of publication of staff reports and other documents allows for the deletion of market-sensitiveinformation.
Copies of this report are available to the public fromInternational Monetary Fund
Publication Services700 19
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Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431Telephone: (202) 623-7430
Telefax: (202) 623-7201E-mail:publications@imf.orgInternet: http://www.imf.orgPrice: $18.00 a copy
International Monetary FundWashington, D.C.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDGREECE
Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility
Prepared by the European Department in Consultation with Other DepartmentsApproved by Reza Moghadam and Lorenzo GiorgianniMarch 9, 2012
Extended Arrangement
. The Greek authorities have requested a 4 year Extended Arrangement in an amount of SDR 23.7853 billion(2,158.8 percent of quota; €28 billion) with purchases equally phased and have notified the Fund of their cancellation of the existingStand-By Arrangement. Euro area member states are expected to contribute a further €144.7 billion in 2012–14. The first Funddisbursement would amount to SDR 1.3991 billion (about €1.65 billion).
Background
. Greece’s efforts to address the combined fiscal and external imbalances built up through 2009 have led to a prolonged anddeepening recession (the economy contracted for a fourth year in 2011, by 6.9 percent), and extremely tight financial conditions (some30 percent of deposits have left the banking system since program inception, due to loss of confidence in the system and dissaving). Notwithstanding this, Greece made progress under the SBA in reducing its competitiveness gap (lowering unit labor costs by 9½ percent)and has made considerable progress with structural fiscal adjustment (reducing the primary deficit by some 6 percent of GDP). However,the competitiveness gap still reaches on average 15-20 percent and closing this will continue to apply downward pressure on economicactivity. Another 5½ percent of GDP in primary fiscal improvement and some percent of GDP in privatizations are needed, alongsidesignificant debt relief, to put public debt on a sustainable trajectory. Moreover, performance under the SBA has revealed that more timewill be necessary to realize structural reforms to improve the fiscal position (e.g. tax collection) and economy-wide productivity. Deepsocial and political tensions and mounting popular discontent with economic policies will likely lead the authorities to call elections after the approval of the arrangement.
Main elements of the program:
Direct measures to improve Greek competitiveness through internal devaluation
. The program aims to make collective bargainingmore effective, reduce the minimum wage, and lower nonwage labor costs. Measures to liberalize services will also help improvecompetitiveness. Earlier competiveness gains should bring forward the recovery and help preserve employment.
Gradual fiscal adjustment built on structural expenditure reforms and improvements in tax collection
. Fiscal adjustment will be backloaded to 2013–14 to help absorb the short term deflationary impact in 2012 of the internal devaluation strategy. Some 5½ percentof GDP in credible structural expenditure measures to reach the 2014 target (a primary surplus of 4½ percent of GDP) will be defined asa condition for completing the first program review. They will tackle social transfers (among other things), but strengthen the core socialsafety net to protect the most vulnerable.
Measures to restore financial sector stability
. Significant resources—€50 billion—will be set aside in the program to help banks copewith the impact of the recession and of restructuring of government debt. Private ownership will be maintained to the extent possible.The framework for bank resolution and recapitalization and for financial sector oversight will also be strengthened, to ensure effectivestewardship of bank recapitalization funds.
A combination of private and official sector involvement to deliver enough debt relief to place debt on a trajectory to reach120 percent of GDP by 2020
. Greece is expected to close a debt exchange with private bond holders prior to the approval of thearrangement, while Euro area member states have committed to provide financing on highly concessional terms. Indeed the Euro areamember states have committed to provide long-term support to Greece on adequate terms, in the event this is necessary, provided Greececontinues to adhere to program policies.
Risks.
The program remains subject to notable implementation risks. In general, Greece has little if any margin to absorb adverse shocksor program slippages. In the event that policy implementation takes longer or falls short, the economy takes longer to respond to labor market and supply-side reforms, or fiscal multipliers are higher (reducing the growth path), a deeper recession and a much higher debttrajectory would be the likely result. Political risks linked to the electoral calendar create additional uncertainty about policyimplementation (and staff has sought political assurances to ensure continuity in policy implementation; see paragraph 50). Thematerialization of these risks would most likely require additional debt relief by the official sector and, short of that, lead to a sovereigndefault. In the absence of continued official support and access to ECB refinancing operations, a disorderly euro exit would beunavoidable, heightening risks to the Fund (see the Supplement to the Staff Report: “Greece—Assessment of the Risks to the Fund andthe Fund’s Liquidity Position”). Program design—in particular the even phasing of support and tight monitoring framework—helps toreduce these risks. The euro area member states’ commitment to provide long-term support to Greece on adequate terms is also a keyconsideration for staff’s recommendation to approve the proposed arrangement.
Discussions
. See the Fund Relations Appendix
Publication
. The Greek authorities consent to the publication of the Staff Report
Contents PageI. Introduction ............................................................................................................................4
II. The Economic Setting for the New Program ........................................................................4
III. Strategy ..............................................................................................................................12
IV. Discussions ........................................................................................................................14
A. The Macroeconomic Framework ............................................................................14
B. Economic Policies ...................................................................................................18
V. Financing .............................................................................................................................35
VI. Program Modalities ...........................................................................................................36
VII. Staff Appraisal ..................................................................................................................41
Tables1. Quantitative Performance Criteria .......................................................................................64
2. Structural Benchmarks Under the SBA, 2010–11 ...............................................................65
3. Selected Economic Indicators, 2007–12 ..............................................................................67
4. Monetary Survey, 2006–11 ..................................................................................................68
5. Financial Soundness Indicators, 2005–11............................................................................69
6. Modified General Government Cash Balance, 2012–15 .....................................................70
7. Status of Fiscal-Structural Reforms, 2012 ...........................................................................71
8. Status of Macro-Structural Reforms, 2012 ..........................................................................72
9. Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework, 2010–20 ........................................................73
10. Summary of Balance of Payments, 2010–16 .....................................................................74
11. General Government Operations, 2009–15 .......................................................................75
12. Authorities' Measures to Meet the 2012 Target .................................................................76
13. Revenue Collection Process, 2012 .....................................................................................77
14. Spending Process, 2012 .....................................................................................................78
15. Monetary Financial Institutions: Uses and Sources of Funds, 2006–16 ............................79
16. International Experience with Banking Crises and Recapitalizations ...............................80
17. Structural Reforms Ahead ..................................................................................................81
18. General Government Financing Requirements and Sources .............................................82
19. External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2010–16 .................................................83
20. Schedule of Proposed Purchases under the Extended Arrangement, 2012–16 .................84
21. Indicators of Fund Credit, 2012–26 ...................................................................................85
Figures1. Selected Economic Indicators ..............................................................................................52
2. Inflation Developments ........................................................................................................53
2
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